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A new concept of the production of industrial 
accidents: a sociological approach 
Torn Dwyer* 
Various comn1.entators have expressed dissatisfaction at the predominant methods of 
anaz;,sing and preventing accidents. An ethnographic stud)', little used as a method for 
inl'estigating industrial accident production, "~as carried out on a French const1uction site. 
This produced ne1v insights into ho\v accidents are p~oduced. Working \Vi thin an actionalist 
perspective a theoretical nzodel of industrial accident production is built. This n1odel is 
derived [ro1n the sociolOKJ' of 1~ork, its li'Orkings are illustrated by re.ference to our field 
stud)' and some of the literature. This model ruptures lt\'ith the do1ninant means of anal)'-
sing accident causation and of concei1,ing accident p~el'ention. The article tentative!)' 
suggests that the social relations of lvork n1a)' beconze a central and profitable focus of 
future atten1pts to analyse and prevent industrial accidents. 
Introduction 
There is a dominant feeling amongst reviewers of industrial safety progran1mes and 
research th.at current methods of analysing and seeking to reduce industrial accidents are 
meeting with little success. (National Institute of Industrial Psychology, 1972; Ellis, 1975; 
Jones, 1973) This has lead to a generalised sentiment tl1at '"radically new theories are 
needed in accident research" (National Institute of Industrial Psychology, 1972). A later 
overview survey broke with tradition when it concluded that: 
for maximum effectiveness, safety programmes should concentrate on those 
practices that can successfully deal with ' 'people" variables ( ~Cohen, 1977, p.177) . 
. 
It did not, however, atten1pt to theorise the nature or ilnportance of such variables. 
A nun1ber of corn1nentators have indicated that a major gap in industrial accident re-
search methods exists; the lack of close ·en1pirical studies of the workplace. It has been 
suggested that this gap is leading to a poor understanding of the causes of accidents . 
(Faverge, 1967) Le Plat (1978, pp. 338-9) states: 
the relevance of the accident analysis depends upon the relevance of the work 
analysis on which it is based. Any analysis of an accident is supported -in n1ost 
cases implicitly - by a model of work on which it is based. 
He goes on to make a plea: 
it is ... necessary to become better acquainted with the worker, the technical 
installation, the workplace, the organisation and their n1anners of functioning, in 
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short, of all the different systems in which the worker is situated in order to 
usefully define the conditions under which accidents occur. It is to this extent 
that the study of accidents can be related to the general study of work conditions. 
From the above 2 sets of observations it could be speculated that: the lack of adequate 
theoretical conceptualisations of the causes of industrial accidents, the lack of close and 
systematic analyses of the workplace and the generally observed ineffectiveness of domi-
nant accident prevention techniques, are interlinked. Should this be so, a close empirical 
workplace study could produce new theoretical insights into the production of accidents 
and eventually lead to the fonnulation of more effective prevention techniques. But an 
extensive literature search showed such a study represented a new approach, even within 
the tradition of the sociology of work. Nichols ( 197 5, p. 217) summarised the "state of 
the art" as:· 
A strange situation this . . . that in the overwhelming number of cases, injury 
and ill-health should not figure in the works of industrial sociologists . 
. However Nichols {1975, pp. 221-1) goes on to emphasise the social character of the 
production of industrial injury, and in so doing provides further confinnation that our 
speculations are worthwhile pursuing: 
injuries at work occur in the context of the social relations of production ... 
injuries and fatalities take place in a particular mode of production which is 
characterised by particular social relations; one moreover in which sociologically, 
if not existentially, neither managers nor men are free agents. 
The choice of research methods and sites 
Based on the above speculations, and operating within a sociological tradition, we de-
cided to carry out a series of field studies in a dangerous industry. A dangerous industry 
was chosen for it was here, we thought, that worker consciousness about accident pro-
duction would be the most clearly developed. We had already worked in and conducted 
research (Dwyer, 1980) into the construction industry; given our technical expertise, it 
appeared appropriate to conduct further research in this high accident industry. The 
decision was n1ade to carry our research of an ethnographic nature on 6 French construc-
tion sites. 
In this article an account of 1 of the sites researched will be presented. We have chosen 
to present this particular site for two reasons: (a) a purely pragmatic one; it is a small 
site hence its dynamics are explicable within the space constraints of the article; {b) it 
portrays types of work relations rarely discussed in modern organisational literature. Field 
techniques of semi-structured interviewing, observation or work and the analysis of written 
documents were employed (these are explained and justified in more depth in Dwyer 1981, 
pp. 4-6; 1978, pp. 140-9). Triangulation was used to check the validity of data gathered by 
1 method against that gathered by another (Denzin, 1970). 
One construction site : an ethnographic study 
Looking at this site fron1 down below it appears very thin. Very grey also. It is going to 
be a service tower for an office cotnplex hence it has been designed with no coloured 
panels, and no windows. A single crane protrudes from its centre. It will be 15 storeys 
when cotnpleted, it is not a large site, 400n12 per floor. Four gangs work on the site, each 
is composed of 4 n1en. In addition, a general foreman and a site foreman are employed to 
supervise the work. 
As one approach~s the site, the lack of exterior scaffolding pem1its a clear view of some 
workers. A person wearing a red hehnet, dressed in blue overalls, opening and closing a 
skip as he pours a concrete wall can be observed ... his manoeuvering is sometimes compli-
• 
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the of the site to another llfle. Here a rail ia place 
tap uf the boxed wall. A safety platform is ia pJace 3 metres below the 3 to be 
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aood at aU'~, in referring to what he and I observed. We arrive oa the 
eorrkion are blocked, there is rubbish everywhere . . . he replies ''If we 
rails, it's because we haven't had time to instaD them • • • we 
" • • • 
the site foreman ... after having heard some unfavourable comments fro1n dle 
he turns to me. "Are the sites like this in your country?,. The field worker's 
of ''neutrality" are Instantly rendered hollow by such a question. ''No", I 
the risk ofbecondng his enmny. "You don't work over there" he bellows 
all your time on safety . . . we work quickly hf're . • . we've gotta 
•• the buildina has to be fin;shed next week, we had 3 months to do it -
1loen in 3 months (the botton 8 floors are below ground level) ..• there's a 
hW~e that we must follow, if not we'll have no more contract- we're worldng 
tlte next contract ... over there (indicating towards the site) 
face twists as he continues: • 
.. ., obli&ed to scream here to make the guys work • . . it's Hk:e that we make 
lllleln work . . . for 6 yean I've worked like that, I'm obqed to .•. Safety, you 
Dow *<l put a safety plank there (he indicates the place), it should be there, but 
trs aecessary to go down 2 storeys to fmd a plank ... we won't go and look for 
it'd make us work more slowly. 
Whilst speaking, he looked at his men . . . sometimes yelling at them ... we were 3 or 
4 in the centre of the floor, a group of 4 men behind us were working in an 
tlll'llled position preparing box;ng. Two workers on one side of the buDding were prepar-
illl hox;ng, they were worldng a metre above us on a platform at the exterior of the 
1R1Jt1iDa. ID front of us the worker with a red helmet wu still standing on his boxing, some 
3 above the floor. Next to him, 2 workers on a platfoan appear to be doing very 
*tre being no more concrete to pour. On our right, high above us, the 3 men who 
.... peudas coacrete 11 we arrived were finishing their work and putting back their 
~ve taiJma. This gang (the 3 men plus the red helmeted worker), it was explained to 
W'll the "lead-gang" on the site. Bach gang works more or less individually, and no 
can 1M seen betweea pop. 
11ft aloDe on the Bite I wafree to obsetve and talk at length with the men. Supply 
W produced (what was acknowledged as) a rare "calm period" for Ufe on this site. 
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On the basis of preliminary interviews the response to the ~uesti?n "How do you ~e 
your job?" produced different replies that indicated. a key d~ensto~ for understandmg 
the functioning of this particular site. The responses gtven to this question were dependant 
on neither the ethnic background nor the level of qualification of the workers. Workers 
responses saw them divided into 2 distinct groups: those dissatisfied with their job and 
those satisfied with it. Strong antagonism was shown by the dissatisfied workers towards 
their satisfied counterparts. The dynamics of this tension, its origins within the systems of 
management employed on the site, and the relationship of these systems to the production 
of industrial accidents, were clarified through further interviewing. Two of the "dissatis-
fied" explained their feeling towards the "satisfied" ... 
There are 3 or 4 guys here who are good with the bosses; when the bosses say 
"we'll give you a raise1 if you work like this" they listen to them. When it was 
snowing we were the only site in the area that kept working ... because that prick 
there (they point to the man wearing the red helmet) said he'd work, and we were 
obliged to follow, otherwise it would have been the street. 
The foreman had apparently offered him a bonus to induce him to work. 
That guy (he's nicknamed "the motor") takes risks that others won't take ... he's 
for the bosses2 he's had accidents because of that, but he'd do anything for a 
bit more money. 
This worker in the red helmet confided: 
Sure safety, it's important ... yeah, I've had accidents, recently something fell 
on my nose, you see (indicating the bump on his nose) ... but it's like that in the 
construction industry. 
He accepted the danger and felt he had a priviliged position on the site. When I asked 
him about the dangerous manner in which he'd been seen pouring concrete he replied 
with a drooped jaw, shrugged shoulders and a refusal to speak. Taking up a point 1 of his 
"satisfied" workmates {A member of the gang I'd seen pouring concrete. This was the 
"lead gang" and had the role of setting the work pace for the site.) related "There's noth-
ing missing here for safety." I indicated the badly placed planks visible on some work 
platforms, the holes in the floor, missing safety rails, workplace disorganisation and work 
pressures ... "That's okay, a fall could happen to anyone ... there'll always be accidents." 
These workers, the "satisfied", were detested by the others; they consented to the 
danger of their task. In order to maintain this consent, they were paid the highest salaries 
of all workers. To maintain this privileged position, they were offered and accepted, incen-
tives which were paid when they took risks that the others would be reluctant to take. 
For them, there did not seem to be any "problem of safety" since the'ir own interests in 
gaining material rewards were directly linked to a lack of safety by the financial incentives 
offered by ·management. Their accidents occurred because they took risks in order to earn 
incentives. For the employers this translated into a double benefit, safety measures could 
be economised on, and, a split was obtained amongst the workers. This split was able to be 
manipulated so as to increase the relative pace of production of the site. The example cited 
of work proceeding in the snow provides 1 example of this. 
The "dissatisfied", who were in different gangs to the "satisfied", showed that they 
were subject to a different system of management. One crucial difference was that these 
workers did not receive any incentive payments for the work they perfonned. Before 
examining this group in depth, let us take a closer look at how work on the site is organised. 
Work appeared, from available indications, to be carried out expeditiously. The lack of 
complicated construction techniques {in comparison with other sites examined) presents 
itself as a striking feature. This feature reduces the relative levels of skill required for 
effective task execution. The gangs are organised so as to work independently of one 
1 Officially payment by results no longer exists in this company - having been abolished as a result 
of union action on other sites. On this non-unionised site the "payments" are offered "under the 
table" in the forn1 of raised salaries. 
2 The general forernan said that this same worker was " a bosses man." 
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explained ill an interview that 1 worker had cut his finser off heCMJ~~ 
too quickly. He did not explain why work was routinely ped'ermed at 
_. except by referring to external time constraints on the job aod 
The " " workers in anotper level of explanation, tbey 
tlleir work speed, their accidents and near misses as being due to the author· 
of the site. · 
Qpe of control was able to be maintained du~ to the worken incapacity to defend 
collectively: as individuals they feel unable to leave tfrlsjob because of the high 
rate in the industry. "I've had several accidents here, because of the speed 
by the foreman), all have been small ... but 1, I fell and only just saved my Hfe". 
_. it was said at a more general level "There are lots of accidents because the boss 
••• that's the problem". 
functioning of this site is dominated by a mixture of authoritp.rianism (for the 
and incentive payments (for the "satisfied"). For the foremen this is justi-
W: "We've got to go quickly here". They don't deny that the required speed leads to 
but remain unconcerned about them; after all they themselves never have any. 
The accidents occurring to the "dissatisfied" workers and the dangers to which they are 
a.P9JIId appear, on analysis, to be produced, above all, by the authoritarianis•n used to 
JINIIIIII the site and via which they are "made to work". The "satisfied" workers treat 
as a part of their task for which they receive higher salaries and incentive payments. 
They do not appear to be subject to authoritarian control. Their acceptance of fmancial 
iacentives, in return for the taking of risks, appears overwhelmingly, as the most important 
proclucer of their exposure to danger and hence of their accidents. 
of the field study 
The foreman, at 1 stage during the research, wanted to show me the good side of his 
lite. He led me to the guard ralls that existed, the holes that had been covered over, the 
protected aad well-lit stairway. It is true that a certain nwnber of safety measures were in 
. One must however ask to what extent they would have existed if independent 
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workplace inspection did not exist? The foreman was able to detennine in advance when 
my research was going to take place, and according to 1 worker: "They've organised some 
protection today, they didn't do it for me, they did it for the inspections. When you've 
gone, it'll be just like it was yesterday." I reflected on the staircase that appeared to have 
been recently swept ... "I built this guard-rail," 1 man said proudly. "When?" I asked. 
"This morning, first thing." 
In spite of the lack of technical complexity, from an engineering point of view, this 
research lead me to hypothesise that the social relations existing on the site would be 
such as to produce a high accident rate. The site statistics showed that during the 3 month 
construction period there had been 5 lost time accidents, these resulted in 155 lost days for 
a total of 17 285 hours worked (including foremen). This frequency rate was more than 
4 times the national average for the sector (28.9 accidents per 100 000 hours worked), the 
severity rate was 14.7 5 days (approximately 120 hours) lost for every 1 000 hours worked3 . 
Towards a sociological understanding of the production of industrial accidents 
Our ethnographic study has suggested that a range of factors within the workplace can 
be seen as being responsible for the production of industrial accidents. What appears to be 
interesting is that the key factors identified as producing accidents, authoritarianism and 
fmancial incentive systems, are virtually ignored in the dominant literature written for and 
used in the study of safety mangen1ent (e.g. Heinrich, 1950: Malasky, 1974). For some 
writers the theoretical groundings of this literature has more to do with promoting the 
mobility of certain professions (e.g. Noble, 1977, p. 289 ff.) For others, the grounding is 
based on little more than attempts to deform science in order to blame worker carelessness 
for the majority of accidents (See Faverge, 1967, pp. 55-2). In both cases, the theories 
developed appear to have little to do with the reduction of industrial accidents. Attempts 
to test hypotheses drawn from these theories are carried out, in the main, in such a manner 
• 
as to deny the relevance of social (as opposed to individual) factors in the operation of the 
workplace and the production of accidents. That literature which seeks to analyse the 
workplace , and to see industrial accidents as located therein , appears to deal with selected 
aspects of the problem. Typically , it examines either 1 type of accident (Friedmann, 
1964: Turner, 1967), or, when based on workplace studies, neglects to examine relation-
ships between observational and interview material and accident record and rate data 
(e.g. Fitzpatrick, 1980: Di Naro, n.d: Pilcher, 1972). In addition, it is unfortunate that the 
vast majority of field studies carried out within the sociology of work seem to ignore the 
systematic treattnent of issues arising out of safety and accidents in the workplace. 
A sociological understanding of the production of industrial accidents must perceive 
of high or low rates in such a way that they are linked neither to the "nature" of an 
industry , nor of the individuals working therein, nor of the materials it transforms and the 
work processes en1ployed. It n1ust attempt to ask questions such as the following: 
What social processes operate that result in a rise in accident rates in 1 industry (firm, 
plant etc) whilst they fall in another? and then ask: If the social processes identified as 
contributing to a low accident rate in 1 industry (firm, plant etc.) were to be introduced 
where accident rates were high, could not an overall reduction in the industry's (firm's, 
plant's, etc.) rate be achieved? 
A sociological 1nodel of the production of industrial accidents must, through its very 
formulation, atten1pt to locate the answers to the above questions within the transforma-
tion of the social relations of work. In atten1pting to lay out such a theoretical n1odel, we 
must go beyond the narrow confines of the data presented in the French field study, and 
into an exan1ination of other relations of work treated in the literature. 
3 1t is not possible t6 calculate the differential rates for the "satisfied" and "dissatisfied" workers 
du e t o the organisation of accident records and n1an hour statistics on the site. 
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that has been left to the individual-member within the context of the soda! 
work. The expUcit function of social relations at each tevel of social reality Ia, 
--- to beneflt the dominant party. • 
point of view of the dominant party in an induatrial capitaJ;st firm5 the 
level refers to the reproduction of the productive forces (labour and capital) for a 
the price received for the product of these forces. The command level refers to 
party's taking active control of the actions of the dominated party. The 
level refers to the dominant party's taking charge of the knowledge and co-
Of the TSRs on which the dominated party works. · 
capitalist fi1n1 cannot continue to exist if it finds itself thwarted with 
to the rewards function. This function does not however, necessarily dominate the 
work Hves of employees. One of the other 2 functions may exert dominance on 
many other observers we do not conceive of, for methodological reasons relatlllg to dift1culties 
,.... non-injury accidents as a focus of analysis. On a theoretical level these are the 
.. f the ame work relatioDI u IJUury accidents, but the relationebip between iDjury and non-
aocidents is not a simple arithmetic one. (c.f. Shannon, 1980) By refexdng to the "sudden 
of work" we have excluded industrial illness from consideration. 
~ A characteristic of an industrial capitalist ium is that an importan• part of the surplus gained from 
t1J.t productive process is invested, once again, in the productive process in order to tranaform 
~ conditions and, in the classical model, the division of labdur. AU such finns are the product 
tlMt aacumulation of capital. (Touraine, 1973, p. 121) We have chosen to treat the industrial 
fb1n as the unit of analyall Iince it is the dontinant form of organisation within which 
..,_.. eccur in the aclvanced wettem uationa such u we have examined in our fieldwork. The 
...,_, to be developed is in no way undeuntued by our pointlllg out that some of the social rela-
tlam to be were formed in preindustrial societies, and that anecdotal or written accounts 
fiOJD tile communist bloc countries produce explanations of accident causation consistent with 
... diiN1oped herein. 
thein, and through this dominance the 
model will attempt to show the possilie effoota ol t1le 
workplace, and since it is to be applied to* 
oriented around an analysis of manual work. 'Ill 
called the employers (and their asents in th.e 
dominated party will be called the workers. 
The composition of the socillllevels of relllity 
The organisational level, when pushed to the extremes of its developm.eat, toittl 
relation in which workers carry out their manual work Without BJlY Ill 
relationship with the TSRs. The employers organise and co-ordinate tietwtMl 
workers and their TSRs. They monopoHse the distribution of knowledge as to the state C1f 
the TSRs. 
Conflict occurs at this level when workers and en1ployen contest the distribution of 
knowledge about the co-ordination of the TSRs. 
Modem management literature speaks extensively of the organisation of productive 
processes and of task co-ordination. The basic assumption contained in this literature Ja 
that management, as the employer's agents, are responsible for controlling the knowleclge 
about and the co-ordination of machines, tools, stock, etc. (e.g. Barnard, 1938: Taylor, 
1971). Taylor sees "Taylorism" explicitly as a technique to strip workers of the lmowledge 
and right to question their relationships with their TSRs and to transfer this knowledge to 
management. For Bravennan ''The more science is incorporated into the labour process, 
the less the worker understands of the process". (1974, p. 425) 
The general consequences of the development of Taylorism such aa the increased 
fraganentation of tasks and the routinisation of work are now well documented, and 
represent a key feature of the contemporary workplace in industrial capitaHst societies. 
Workers are, through the development of the organisational level by employers, grad-
ually transfonned into the mere executants of an unskilled manual task;employers, through 
their domination at this level gradually control all the knowledge and co-ordination of the 
TSRs and, on the basis of this control, manage the workplace to their own benefit. The 
workers end up working either at a monotonous task, at a task for which they do not have 
adequate knowledge of their relationship with those TSRs external to that task (disorgani-
sation), or they lack the necessary knowledge and skill to successfully transform the 
TSRs upon which they work (underqualification). In any work situation where the organi-
sational level is dominant, any 1 or all of these factors may affect the. worker. The degree 
to which these effects are realised depends on the nature and extent of domination at this 
level. 
When pushed to the extremes of its development the command level forms a social 
relation in which employers have the power to direct workers' actions to such an extent 
that they act on parts of the work system in a manner that they consciously recognise as 
being against their own interest. 
When this level exercises dominance in the day-to-day functioning of the workplace, the 
employers benefit due to the workers being unable to oppose the tasks Imposed upon 
them. The breaking of workgroup cohesion ensures continued employer domination of 
workers. 
Conflict occurs at this level when the workers organise themselves collectively to contest 
their employer's power and when the employers seek to break worker power and work-
group organisation. 
Texts detailing aspects of the history of Great Britain's industrialisation provide access-
ible in-depth discussion on the functioning of this leve1.6 Modem organisational Uterature 
6 See Tressell (1967) .for a novelistic account, Thompson and Yeo (1971) for ajoumaliat'a '" ... _ 
and Building Accident Committee ( 1907) and Children's Employment Commission (1842) for some 
close insights into worker, employer and various professional conceptions of the operation of the 
command level. 
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of the individual-member level 
eJdlts another level of reality in the workplace. A level which is not analysable as 
relation of social domination, its role is however, to a large extent limited 
clttecanined) by the functioning of the social relations of work. This level 
what is left to the individual worker, that part of hint/her wlp.ch has not been 
oemmanded or rewarded. We call this "remainder" the individual-member level. 
wodcer expresses himself individually, arriving at work in a happy state perhaps 
11eca•e he hu just become a father or by arriving at work intoxicated. The worker can act 
IJWMduaBy at 1 of the social levels in order to reinforce the employer's or the worker's 
pewer at that level. The individual sabotaging an assembly line, the undercover organiser 
tlf a trade union and the rate-buster in a piecework factory all express different dimen-
of this level of reality. The saboteur refuses the assembly line u the controller of his/ 
work speed. The organiser seeks to collectively contest the command power of his/her 
The rate-buster seeks self enrichment through accepting the employer's defmi-
of work and refusing the counter-definition made by fellow workers. 
WliBa to a social level of reality, action tmgaged in~t the individual-member level 
• profoundly shape the future functioning of that level. The social articulation of such 
..._ ia a.-sary to ensure its success in changing the relations of dominance within a 
W. t literature discusses limiting and controlling the ne&ative effects of the 
nno~er level on the anooth running of the company. Bureaucratic rules (Goul-
... 
f 111e .., of an industrial worker this can range from the Brazilian worker who seeks a bare subsis-
._.. tO a North Sea oil platform diver who seeks a salary that will allow him to own 2 cars 
•'•IJoat. ' 
• 
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dner, 1954), "discipline" and social psychology are tools employed in an effort to reward, 
command and organise this level, to subject the autonomy remaining to the worker to the 
logic of social domination. Employers sometimes seek to harness this level of reality in 
order to break collective worker control at a given level of social reality; the encourage-
ment of the rate-buster in order to break rate-fiXing is just one example. During the recruit-
ment or job-transfer process employers (sometimes with union backing) may seek to 
"screen out" employees with "individual-member characteristics" considered to be un-
desirable for a particular job (e.g. colour blindness, slow auto-motor reactions, sensitivity 
to heat), and in so doing reduce accidents produced by the interaction between certain 
individual characteristics and the design of certain tasks. The task remains unchanged, but 
the people are changed. 
Power relations 
The relative importance of each level in the production of goods and services under-
taken in the workplace is detennined socially. Factors internal and external to the work-
place limit these detenuinations. Power relations are not "hidden behind" the mode of 
functioning of each level, the social relations existing at each level are the result of and 
the expression of power relations as they fonn and refonn in the workplace through 
repression, consensus and struggle. 
The dominance of any 1 level is an expression of both conflict within the workplace 
and the influence of those external factors (e.g. at an abstract level, economy, law, culture, 
and in the concrete example of our French site, the threat of inspections) that limit the 
social formation of the workplace. The dominance of 1 level, as opposed to another, is 
nothing other than the expression of power relations. A change in the relative dominance 
of a level within the workplace is an expression of a change in power relations. 
In applying the model of industrial accidents to the analysis of work, it must be remem-
bered that the categories that have been developed in this article are idealisations. It is 
rare to fmd a workplace where 1 level of social relations exercises total dominance, equally 
it is rare to fmd a particular social relation operating in a pure fonn "pushed to the ex-
tremes of its development". 
Analytically different patterns of social relations may, at different moments and for 
different workgroups, exist within the same workplace. We can thus conceive of 2 work-
groups working at the same process within a factory - 1 lacks training while the other, 
a well trained group, is highly motivated by the offer of piece-rate payments. Their acci-
dent rates are similar. A union or a mangement decision to suspend piece-rate payments 
could, according to the model developed, be expected to result (other things remaining 
equal) in the lowering of the accident rate for the latter group, whilst not affecting the 
rate of the fonner. 
Putting the model to work 
How do the categorisations developed in the model assist us to conceptualise the causa-
tion and prevention of industrial accidents? What empirical evidence does the literature 
provide to validate our choice of analytical categories? Before seeking to answer this 
question we must note that sociological perspectives appear to have had little influence on 
the overall focus of research or on action taken in the name of industrial accident preven-
tion. The evidence presented in the rest of this article will be derived from those few 
studies that can be interpreted as having operationalised the various social relations which 
n1ake up our theoretical model.8 
8 To the best of out knowledge this sociological model of industrial accidents (and its more sopis-
ticated variant found in Dwyer (1978)) is the only theoretical model currently available that pennits 
the various empirical results cited here to be treated as integral parts of the same holistic conception. 
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Ia Pads showed that 5.1 percent of fatal construction accidents were due to "a lack of 
co ordination between workers performing the same task" (Wisniewski, 1977, p. 108). On 
the French site examined, no clear evidence was presented to point to the existence of this 
IOGial relation. In the absence of finer grained measuring instruments (perhaps derived 
from sociometry), we can hypothesise that any attempt to reduce accidents by increasing 
t1ae dep-ee of effective communication on this site would be unsuccessful. 
At tile level workers may lack the knowledge necessary to carry out their jobs Jn aalety because manqement has not provided theJV with such knowledge. This 
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It ~QJWed as to the reductions appropriate training programmes can produce. On the 
158 Tom Dwyer 
French site examined, there was no evidence as to the existence of this relation, nor to the 
existence of disorganisation. This absence appeared, from the fieldwork, to be to a large 
extent due to the way in which the site had been planned by management. 
Disorganisation is discussed as a cause of accidents in much of the mainstream accident 
prevention literature. Prevention of disorganisation is seen in the concept of "good house-
keeping". At a more critical level, Dassa (1976, pp. 406-7) examines and critiques the role 
played by the designers of work in producing workplace disorganisation and its dangers. 
Once again, a lack of close empirical studies frustrates our ability to find evidence con-
finning that a rise or fall in disorganisation is co-related with a rise or fall in accident rates. 
The worker can, at the organisational level, be transformed into the mere executant of 
a manual task for which he/she has the necessary knowledge. This task, however., lacks 
variety and is of a repetitive nature. The continued perfonnance of such a task can lead to 
fatigue, boredom or over-familiarity. Industrial accidents are seen to be a consequence 
(Caillard, 1976, p. 281 ). This phenomenon was not found on the French site examined. In 
an effort to reduce the effects of this work, ergonomically designed tools and machines 
may be introduced by management (or as a response to union or state pressure).. The work 
of Wisner ( 1972) in France has, with trade union support, been influential in bringing 
ergonomic perspectives to bear in the redesign of repetitive work. 
At the individual-member level workers act out that liberty which has not been suppre-
ssed or controlled for in the workplace. This can generate accidents when the worker 
knowingly or unknowingly places himself or workmates in danger as a result of such 
action. In addition, the individual-member may have certain innate characteristics that are 
undetected by management's screening practices. In certain cases these characteristics may 
lead to accidents. A colour blind worker can, for example, cause specific accidents that 
colour sigh ted workers would not cause . 
A great deal of thinking about industrial accidents has been oriented around diagnoses 
of individual human characteristics or actions. These are seen as the principal causes of 
accidents. The prevention methods suggested by such analyses imply that increasing 
various types of managerial control of the individual-member is the only efficient course 
to follow. Employers and managers are thus freed from having to consider the role played 
by the ~ocial relations of work in producing industrial accidents. 
On the French site examined, no evidence was produced to demonstrate that the 
individual-member level was responsible for the production of accidents. It was certainly 
possible .that a "dissatisfied" worker could act at this level in an atten1pt to discipline the 
"satisfied" workers. Such action could easily involve the latter being deliberately exposed 
to considerable danger by a member of the former group. 
It is doubtful whether the individual-me1nber level, isolated from the other levels in the 
workplace (and outside of its "screening for the job'' aspect), plays an important role in 
producing real industrial accidents. Empirical tests of relevant hypotheses, such as accident 
proneness, have never established their general validity. (Faverge, 1967, p. 156: ·Crawford, 
1974: Cronin, 1971, p. 131). 
Conclusion 
The sociological model of industrial accidents developed in this paper produces a new, 
theoretically grounded, atten1pt to firstly conceptualise and secondly categorise the social 
relations which produce accidents. In so doing, new methods of analysis and the conse-
quent strategies of prevention are opened up for systematic application. 
Having conceptualised the causes of accidents in this manner and, in so doing, having 
made their prevention dependent on changes in social relations, we have departed radically 
from the politics of dominant perspectives on accident prevention. In so doing, we have 
hoped to add a new axis to the attempt to find methods by which accident rates can be 
lowered. Thjs paper represents little n1ore than a small attempt to expose what may one 
day provide a basis for the "radically new theories . . . needed in accident research". 
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